8 Enduring World
Record
I flew zoom flights on every one of the 3
airplanes as part of certifying them for use by
the ARPS. In a way they became routine to the
extent that I don’t find anything memorable
about every one, but that was not always the
case. The flight on which I got the highest
altitude became memorable, for that reason
alone. I decided on 2.4 Mach and 35,000 feet.
It was unfortunate that I had no place to turn
for any energy management or performance
analyses for improvement, since we had no money
appropriated and the use of the analog computers
of the time were very manpower intensive.
I continued to be so busy in the cockpit on my
earliest zoom flights that I had no idea what
the view was out of the cockpit from the moment
I started to pull up until I was under aero
control again and into my dive toward earth and
home. The helmet on the full pressure suit was
affixed with a metal ring, and although the
pilot’s head could move within it, visual
restrictions remained. Once pull up for zoom
commenced, it became impossible to look at
earth, therefore all flight attitude control was
by instruments, as would be the case flying in
heavy clouds, except with a lot more things
happening very rapidly. I might mention that the
cooling system in those suits was bad and I was
looking through a liquid coated glass throughout
the flight. I did not allow myself an
opportunity to look away from the instruments
for even a split second, so it was only after
gained experience that I would allow myself a
view that made the whole project a dream.
I finally had reached the confidence and
competence level where I could relax enough to
view the sky, if only for seconds at a glance.
It was blacker than any night sky I ever saw and
seemed to hang atop the beauty of the glowing
white halo upon the rounded earth. As I rotated
from nose-up to down at peak altitude on this
flight, I viewed
this sight at the highest I would ever fly the
AST, a sight that few had beheld.
I had already begun drafting the
Partial
Flight Manual, which I later completed. It
was identified as partial, because it covered
those systems and procedures peculiar to the
AST, as an addendum to the standard F-104A
Flight Manual. Unfortunately, I had to remove
any references to the design mission, maximum
altitude zoom, because of an incident soon to
occur, so the attached PFM does not cover that.
It included facts about the aircraft, its
systems, checklists and emergency procedures,
some born of my imagination, which I had
developed for anticipated failures, as I gained
insight into potential risks while testing.
When Jack and I started, we had no idea of what
to expect.
Among conceived but real risks, for example, was
canopy or heat loss during the zoom. It was
extremely rare but canopies have suddenly failed
and the pressure differential on the AST canopy
was greater than usual because of the virtual
vacuum outside. Heater failure was more likely,
with the dead engine, too. Either failure would
be extreme because the pressure suit got very
hot, so my helmet visor was always covered with
a water film inside, and with both it would have
frozen solidly, resulting in zero vision.
Lifting the visor would mean immediate death
from blood boiling, even before oxygen anoxia
could do it peacefully.
Blind and uncontrolled, high-speed reentry could
very well result in catastrophic structural
failure. The only solution that I conceived was
to hold the stick aft, and add nose-up RCS for
good measure, and cross controls in hopes of
inducing a tumble or spin on reentry. At that
point, other immediate problems would exist. If
the canopy was intact the cockpit was full of
nitrogen, which had to be eliminated by feeling
for and activating the cockpit dump. At that
point after opening the cockpit manual
depressurization, then depressurization of the
pressure suit would be an indication of lower
altitude and a chance to momentarily open the
pressure visor and take a look, at the altitude.
Even if the canopy remained intact, it would be
very risky to try opening the visor, even for a
brief peek while holding breath. What if it
would not reseal in such a cold atmosphere, or I
did it above 60 or 70,0000 feet and the blood
boiled, an immediate fatal occurrence. The best
choice was to remain in the blind spin/tumble
and then when the pressure suit decompressed,
open visor and attempt spin recovery, and/or
bailout depending on altitude. Against the
alternative of a blind ejection at extreme
altitude, inside a wet suit, it seemed the only
viable risk. Even descending under a chute, the
decision of when to open a fouled visor could be
a big one.
One of my maximum zooms came as close as
anytime in my life to being absolutely deadly,
missing only by split seconds. To a reasonable
extent the maximum zoom mission was becoming
routine, or at least very comfortable for me. I
was on one and had just reached Mach 2.2 with
full jet and afterburner power and 100% rocket
thrust and was literally a split-second from
starting the 3.5 g pull-up. At the moment I
started to move the stick to begin ascent I was
suddenly suffocated, like a giant had grabbed my
face, precisely at a time that I had fully
exhaled. I could not inhale one iota! It was
the most startling moment I can remember and
instinctively I rolled inverted and pulled full
g’s into a vertical dive, opening the manual
cockpit pressure dump valve to clear out the
nitrogen as quickly as possible. I didn’t even
use speed brake because I knew I had just a
short time before I couldn’t stand the pain of
not being able to breath, already with no oxygen
in my lungs. It was excruciating to be on empty
in the lungs and not able to do anything about
it. If I opened the visor, my only option, a
few deep breaths of pure nitrogen from the
cockpit would stop the pain, permanently, so I
had to allow as much time as possible to
dissipate it through the small orifice of the
dump.
I throttled back only later because I had to
lose altitude with all speed. Finally I could
stand no more of it. I opened my visor and took
a full breath, the most wonderful one in a
lifetime. I quickly expelled it and repeated
the process to get the newest and freshest air
into my lungs as the cockpit was picking it up
by rapidly replacing air. By 20,000 feet, I
knew I had made it and was slowing down.
The afterthoughts when I was back on the ground
recognized that had I even barely begun the
pull-up before I was smothered, I would have had
only the choice of opening my visor to die
easily in seconds from anoxia, or dump the
cockpit also and the result would have been
boiling of the blood, a fate which befell a
student test pilot in a standard F-104 zoom,
when his pressure suit glove came off.
The cause of the suit failure in this case
proved to be a tiny one-way valve in
the small oxygen feed line, which metered oxygen
in and exhaled air out. The one possible, but
unrecognized failure point had failed!
We had the best group of professionals in our
physiology organization, under Major Ralph
Richardson, who ran the lab, including training
and qualification in the pressurization
chamber. They maintained our gear and had
vast
experience with years of high altitude testing,
including the X-15 program. Among them was
Airman, Richard Coe, who was a whiz with the
suits. There had never been a case of such a
failure anywhere and the suits had been
considered to have no single points of failure.
Not so, thereafter.
I sometimes wondered, after that flight, if it
happened seconds later, whether the accident
investigators would have guessed at pilot error
or aircraft malfunction, suspecting the former
more likely. It is unlikely in a crash from
above 35,000 feet with full power on at the
moment of that event there would be enough to
find the cause. In fact, de-bonding of a tiny
plastic washer which was inset and bonded to the
seat of the small metal plunger, which served as
valve for the oxygen port, had never occurred in
testing or use of a full pressure suit. Would
anyone have searched there even if the assembly
survived, had I crashed … two unlikely events?
No chance, but my ghost would be hanging around
to haunt the board members, if that had
happened!
I was not requested to present an AST test plan,
nor did anyone show great interest in the tests,
only curiosity about the peak altitude on early
flights. I was the pilot, and Test Director,
since I enjoyed no aid and had no direction from
anyone on it. I figured I was about in the
middle of my test program, since no limits had
been dictated and optimization of maximum
altitude could now be gradually determined with
incremental increases in climb angle, the only
feasible variable.
Stability margins are decreased at high mach,
and especially as angle of attack is increased,
which was necessary for a 3.5 g pull-up to max
zoom. This would be the limiting condition for
maximum speed at pull-up so in an effort to
expand the performance, at least for a world
record which I was presumed by most everyone to
be headed for. I contacted the best Lockheed
aerodynamics engineer to find what limit I might
go to above 2.2 and safely make the pull-up. I
was told that it could be done without loss of
stability and structural failure at 2.4 Mach,
but only so long as the aircraft’s automatic
stability augmentation system (SAS) did not to
fail or disconnect during the pull up. The
system had a low failure rate and the period of
time was short enough for me to accept that.
On 6 December 1963I made a flight with that set of
conditions and achieved 120,800 feet, gaining
almost 2000 over previous best. When I would fly
to beat the Russian record, and we all thought
that was a certainty, it was important for
America to gain the greatest margin. There was
no way to know at the time, that the altitude I
reached that day, if it had been sanctioned,
would remain the official world record even
today, almost 40 years later, since it has never
been exceeded by the 3% necessary to replace
it. Unfortunately, the Russians have held
that record from before that time until the
present. |