4 Theory to
Reality
A maximum zoom at 70-degrees
pitch, that Lockheed’s austere studies
recommended, would begin at 35,000 feet and Mach
2.2, with a 3.5 g pull up to a pitch angle of 70
degrees, that is, the nose pointed up and
maintained throughout much of the climb at that
angle above the horizon. The pilot, in a
pressure suit could no longer see earth shortly
after starting that pull and until completing
the climbing zoom. The AARS was the primary
flight instrument, and displayed pitch angle, as
well as roll and
yaw, the latter two held by the
pilot at zero, i.e. trim when in the aero
region. That constant-pitch climb would result
in gradually decreasing speed, a decreasing
flight path angle and an increasing
angle of
attack. All of these (calculated with a rather
austere mathematics analysis) should optimize
the maximum possible altitude somewhere around
120,000 feet, according to Lockheed Aircraft
engineers.
The objective was to hold that pitch in
the climb until intercepting a new flight path
at the point in the climb where alpha
increased to 16-degrees, to be held constant
until reentry by controlling the
attitude
through a rapidly changing parabolic path
controlled by the pull of gravity. That required
the AST pilot to command a constantly varying
rate of nose-down pitch, along with maintaining roll and yaw at zero without the airplane’s
static stability, which would be lost in all
axes in the space-like portion of the flight.
It would truly act like and must be controlled
like a spacecraft. That phase of the mission
would necessitate careful pilot maneuvering
solely with the RCS by continuing to
maintain zero yaw and roll while changing pitch
through 140 degrees of nose down before being in
full 70 degree dive recovery, and reentry into
enough air for the AST to become an airplane,
once again. Not until later, and addition of a
modification, were speed brakes permitted during
reentry, so the maintenance of 16 degree alpha
was necessary to avoid unsafe conditions during
the descent.
The 140-degree nose down was absolutely critical
to be completed in the period between leaving
the aero region and before falling back into the
atmosphere to avoid loss of control on re-entry
into the aerodynamic region. Failure to do so
put the AST outside safe and recoverable flight,
in any number of uncontrollable maneuvers from
tumbling to irrecoverable flat spin.
Careful and constant control of alpha
was the only way to assure safe flight since
failure to constantly react properly could move
quickly into a unrecoverable situation, because
of RCS power limits and the very rapid changes
required in nose-down approaching the apogee of
the parabolic path. To achieve that demanded
the pilot maintain proper and continually
changing pitch in nose down. A nose down
pitch rate had to accelerate to be fastest
at the apogee and then steadily decelerate to
zero upon regaining full aerodynamic flight.
That meant continual attention and constant
control inputs. We were to find out in actual
tests that these pitch changes would also induce
motions and necessary corrections in beta
adding an unexpected measure of complexity.
The pitch axis was clearly the most difficult
and critical of the axes, but failure to
maintain zero roll and yaw could also prove
dangerous, so flying all three with the RCS was
imperative. The AARS, attitude
indicator, was critical for the zoom. Because
the pilot could not see earth after pull up and
until most critical controlling was complete,
the entire zoom had to depend on instrument
flying.
Attitude control was primary, but other tasks
could not be ignored, during the climb.
The afterburner required gradual throttle
reduction until over-temperature could no longer
be avoided, at about 75,000 feet at which point it
had to be shut down. The main jet engine was at
full throttle to about 85,000, but requiring
similar monitoring and throttle retards, until
minimum idle and finally shutdown at temperature
limit. After jet shutdown only the Rocket engine
was propelling the AST, until it ran out of its
oxidizer, hydrogen peroxide (H2O2), which mixed
with the JP-4 jet fuel for combustive thrust.
It was very important but difficult to maintain
the optimum pitch angle without constant
attention as the aircraft fought to drop the
nose with speed decrease, without retrim of the
elevator, which would have added hazard on
reentry. And lost pitch angle could not be
regained, at least without great loss of
energy/altitude. Lacking any indications of
energy loss, it was critical to performance and
safety to stay on schedule. Later events of a
very famous test pilot would demonstrate the
risks of that, vividly!
Maintenance of yaw and roll were important to
safety and performance, but were relatively
routine, as in instrument flying, because of
aero trim until above 100,000 feet, after which
yaw proved to be another thing, altogether.
Another very critical aspect surfaced
approaching the apogee, as altitude increased
and speed decreased. When the normal controls
began failing to respond to pilot inputs the AST
was changing from airplane to spaceplane and the
latter had totally different flying and control
requirements. At that point the pilot began a
transition from the stick and rudders to the RCS
hand-controller on the left side of the
instrument panel, combining control for a
period.
Up to that point the AST was a typical airplane
with static and dynamic stability and a normal
proportional rate control system. From there on it became a space vehicle
with zero stability and a fixed thrust
angular-acceleration control system. In fact, it
proved to become somewhat unstable due to
cross-coupling of yaw and pitch from the
gyroscopic effects of the rapidly rotating jet
engine, long after the jet engine was shut down.
This had not been predicted.
In short, thrusters are rotation accelerators,
so AST attained a constant rotational velocity
about any axis depending on how long the thrust
command was applied. So it would take the same
duration counter-command to stop it. Since
position of AST was the critical issue, it would
more than double that effort just to stop it, to
then move back to a given position and all of
that without the rapid and variable control
power available in the proportional control
system of an airplane.
The difficulties of the zoom climb were
significant in the many actions required besides
controlling the craft, all of which was
exacerbated because the pilot had no visual
reference, just sky. With the seat canted back
14 degrees to the aircraft axis, we were on our
back at 84 degree pitch, in a full pressure suit
with fixed helmet. I didn’t see earth from
pull-up until over the top and it took a few
flights before I found time to look away from
the instruments even for a couple of seconds,
but the view at apogee proved to be well worth a
glance.
Shaped like a pump handle of a yard spray tank,
the RCS controller was rotated in the
desired roll direction, pushed left and right
for corresponding yaw and raised to nose up for
increased alpha or down to lower it. Any and all
command combinations were possible.
Factors that exacerbated the problems for max
zoom, were the limited time allowable to
complete the 140-degree pitch-over with the
fixed power of each thruster at 250 pounds, a
total of 500, always fired in a pair. These,
adapted from the X-15, proved sufficient, even
redundant, when used properly, since the control
torque was therefore 500 times the distance to
the AST center of gravity
, measured in foot
pounds.
There were other dangerously critical things
like oxidizer temperature necessary in flight,
but once the rocket was lit and the nose pointed
up 70 degrees that was the best you could do to
fix a problem, in fact, was the only way to rid
that explosive risk.
A brief summary might put the difficulties
faced by the AST pilot in perspective.
Propulsion in space requires rockets to supply
their own fuel and oxidizer for combustion and
gain thrust from their reaction to the gas
products of combustion expelled from the motor
nozzle, in opposite direction from the exhaust
gases. The jet engine is different only in that
its fuel is combined with ambient air as the
oxidizer, so it becomes useless as space is
approached.
Aerodynamic forces are employed to control
attitude on aircraft, but they too become
useless in space and miniature rockets can serve
as attitude thrusters, as they did for the AST.
Directional control requires not only thrusting
of a rocket, but the addition of aiming, which
requires control of the crafts attitude.
Control-of-attitude is most complex and
demanding. It is totally different between the
regions of atmosphere and space. An airplane
can be configured by design to be inherently
stable in its attitude (stay where put) but
spacecraft lack stability, no matter how
configured. Only with the advent of
supercomputers, not available at the time of
AST, has it been possible to incorporate
auto-stability in both air and space craft.
The attitude control with thrusters was
vitally critical ‘over-the-top’ in a maximum
zoom of AST because if the pilot varied much he
could reenter the aerodynamic region outside the
airplane’s stability limits resulting in certain
loss of control with the possibility of being
unable to recover and land safely. These facts
were demonstrated during the AST test program on
all three occasions, when the limits were
exceeded.
Here’s a brief summary of some of the
pilot’s challenges in attitude control of AST,
explained more technically in the AIRCRAFT
section of this website.
Airplanes’ have “Proportional Rate”
attitude-control systems that allow the pilot to
move them about all three axes of motion within
a large range of rotational velocities merely by
selecting a control position. To stop the
motion immediately, the control is returned to
null, aided by the natural stability of the
craft.
Space flight allows only “Fixed
Acceleration” for attitude control systems,
which, coupled with lack of stability, made the
AST very difficult to control safely in space.
Difficulties in controlling it were increased by
gyroscopic effects from the jet engine’s
rotation. Space controls activated in any of
the three axes of motion cause a spacecraft to
continue accelerating around that axis at the
system’s design rate for as long as the control
is held on. Because of the space vehicle’s lack
of stability it doesn’t stop like the airplane
when released but will continue to rotate at the
final velocity achieved based on the period of
acceleration. That is where the toughest
challenge existed. It took just as long to stop
the motion as it took to cause it, and if you
consider that the intention was merely to change
the attitude to a safe position, it is easy to
see how difficult to estimate leads and lags in
trying to achieve an aim position. Occurring in
three orthogonal rotation-axes and disturbed
with outside influences and the challenge became
daunting. There is no way to equate it to the
experiences of aerial flight. |